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Abstract: We experimentally investigate whether framing an individual-choice decision in 
a market setting results in a different outcome than when the decision is described in a 
context-free frame. We further explore whether the context effect is triggered solely by the 
frame or whether a richer descriptive content is required to establish familiarity with the 
decision-making environment. Understanding what constitutes context is central to 
formulating practical recommendations aiming to improve the quality of individual 
decisions. Our results show that framing a sequential search problem as selling houses leads 
to better decisions than a context-free frame. Manipulating whether or not the framed 
decision-making scenario includes a description of the house, which would be naturally 
available in a real estate market, does not impact the length of search or the value of accepted 
offers.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Economic rationality can often be observed in social and economic institutions that 
provide interactive experience within a particular context in which the decisions are made 
(see Plott 1987; Smith, 1962 and 1991). However, a large fraction of individual decision-
making experiments testing for rationality is context free and employs neutral framing. At 
the same time, empirical evidence points out that decisions, whether in an individual or 
strategic setting, are sensitive to framing (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; McNeil, Pauker, 
Sox & Tversky, 1982; Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987) and that embedding a decision-making 
problem in a context can improve the quality of decisions (e.g., Eger & Dickhaut, 1982; 
Griggs & Cox, 1982).1 The ability to make better decisions in context can be explained by 
the dual-processing theory. Dual-processing theory proposes that most daily decisions are 
made by associating a new situation with existing knowledge in similar experiences, rather 
than forming new knowledge and information for each new experience (Kahneman, 2003). 
People use existing schemas that contain effective strategies constructed from previous 
experiences to make decisions. A schema is a system of organizing and perceiving new 
information, which is then encoded as default assumptions about the world. Schemas form 
mental structures that describe how the world works, and how we interact with the world 
(see Bower & Cirilo, 1985; Dimaggio, 1997; Narvaez & Bock, 2002, for more details).2 For 
instance, when someone holds a schema that maximizing profit is the best approach to make 
decisions, she will consistently re-apply this schema in various economic situations. Gilboa 
and Schmeidler (1995) and Jehiel (2005) propose arguments related to schema activation 
that effective contexts work through memory cues from past experience. People with 
existing experience in the presented context can evoke this past experience to guide their 
behavior in the current task.  
From the perspective of behavioral sciences, a schema prescribes particular rules of 
behavior and its activation is often evidenced indirectly, for example by comparing choices 
made in a context-free setting with contextualized choices. In everyday life virtually all 
decisions are made within a context. Therefore, it is crucial to understand how contexts that 
could potentially activate a schema are generated and to identify the amount of information 
needed in a context in order to alter behavior. In this paper we study whether framing an 
individual-choice decision in a market setting results in a different outcome than when the 
decision is described in a neutral (context-free) frame. We further explore whether a change 
in behavior can be triggered by the frame itself or whether a richer descriptive content is 
required to establish familiarity with the decision-making environment. Understanding what 
 
1 See also Kay & Ross (2003), Rege & Telle (2004), Liberman, Samuels & Ross (2004), Hennig-Schmidt, 
Sadrieh & Rockenbach (2010), Dufwenberg, Gächter & Hennig-Schmidt (2011), Ellingsen, Johannesson, 
Mollerstrom & Munkhammar (2012) for more examples of decisions being sensitive to framing. 
2 Note that the literature implicitly assumes that the “correct” schema is activated, which then in turns improves 
the quality of decisions. In our study we will be able to verify this assumption by observing and evaluating the 
quality of decisions through the lens of a particular theory.  
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constitutes context is central to formulating practical recommendations aiming to improve 
the quality of individual decisions. It is important to note that certain contexts cannot be 
created or easily replicated in the lab, however one can frame (label) the decision and 
provide additional information about the environment to invoke a particular context and 
enhance the link between the laboratory and everyday life decision-making.3 
We explore our questions in a sequential search task, known as the secretary problem 
(Gardner, 1960), in which individuals decide whether to accept the presented offer or 
whether to keep searching for a better one. Within this setting we frame the decisions as 
selling houses and manipulate whether or not the decision-making scenario includes a 
description of the house, which would be naturally available in a real estate market. Note 
that in reality buying or selling a house do often follow the processes of secretary problem. 
In parallel to the field, at no stage do our participants receive information regarding the 
distribution of offers or the optimal (highest) offer. Our findings show that decisions framed 
as selling houses, irrespectively of whether house descriptions are available or not, result in 
higher earnings and are closer to the optimal amount of search (approximated by numerical 
methods) than neutrally-framed (and thus context-free) decisions. Our experiment thus 
provides evidence that context can be established solely with framing and that no additional 
descriptive information is necessary. 
The contribution of our study also has a methodological aspect. For certain research 
questions in social sciences, and economics in particular, the lack of context in subject 
instructions is desirable as the sole focus on induced values leads to more control over the 
data generating process than simulating alleged circumstances would (Smith, 1976). Using 
loaded language and engaging participants in “roleplay,” runs the risk that home-grown 
values and preconceived notions of how one “should” behave in a given emotionally-
charged scenario will dominate the pecuniary incentives (see Cox & Oaxaca, 1989 and 
Friedman & Sunder, 1994 for a discussion; Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat & Smith, 1994 and 
Hoffman, McCabe & Smith, 1996 for early experimental studies framing ultimatum game 
and dictator game decisions as market interactions; and Alekseev, Charness & Gneezy, 2017 
for a survey of using contextual instructions in economics experiments). At the same time, 
it is crucial to recognize that the lack of context itself might result in loss of control, for 
example when comparing the behavior of participants from different populations and 
attributing the observed difference to “culture” or “group preferences,” without properly 
understanding the context that the subjects might self-impose to help them interpret the 
experimental scenario and incentives. Ultimately, whether context enhances or diminishes 
control depends on the research question and deciding whether to implement it is an 
 
3 There appears to be a lack of consensus in the literature regarding the difference between the context and 
framing effect, with some authors using the two terms interchangeably. In the current paper, we refer to 
decisions being made in a particular context and this context could be experienced in a natural setting or 
introduced by framing. We use the term “context effect” when behavior changes due to a change in context in 
which the decision is made. In our experiment, such a change is caused by framing. 
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important design issue. Our main methodological contribution to this debate stems from our 
finding that framing itself is sufficient to generate a particular context even though the 
context has likely not been experienced before by the participants.  
 
2 RELATIONSHIP TO THE LITERATURE  
Many decision-making situations are sequential in life; such decisions often need to 
be made immediately and in certain instances cannot be revisited. This type of sequential 
decision-making situation displays the features of the secretary problem.4 The classical 
secretary problem has been specified in the following way (Gardner, 1960). A known 
number of n candidates is presented randomly in a sequence. The decision-maker must either 
accept or reject the presented candidate immediately and the decision cannot be recalled.5 A 
positive payoff is earned only if she chooses the best overall candidate. The optimal decision 
rule of the classical version of the secretary problem allows the decision-maker to maximize 
the probability of finding the best candidate. The decision rule states that the decision-maker 
should reject the first n/e (≈ 0.37 as n approaches infinity) of the candidates and then accept 
a candidate who is better than any of the previously rejected candidates (see Lindley, 1961; 
Gilbert & Mosteller, 1966 for a detailed proof). The chance of finding the best candidate 
increases to approximately 58% as n approaches infinity (Gilbert & Mosteller, 1966) when 
the distribution of the quality of candidates is available and known. However, often it is not 
and must be inferred during the process itself.   
Researchers have explored many different features and variations of the secretary 
problem. A number of assumptions have been relaxed and their implication investigated 
both theoretically (e.g. Gilbert & Mosteller, 1966; Lindley, 1961; Moriguti, 1993; Tamaki, 
1979; Yeo, 1998) and experimentally (e.g., Bearden, Murphy & Rapoport, 2005; Bearden, 
Rapoport & Murphy, 2006; Seale & Rapoport, 1997, 2000; Zwick, Rapoport, Lo & 
Muthukrishnan, 2003, Teodorescu, Sang & Todd, 2018; Angelovski & Güth, 2019). Early 
stopping behavior is a frequent finding in experiments on the variation of the secretary 
problem (e.g. Seale & Rapoport, 1997, 2000). Early stopping behavior is even reported in a 
context-free job search problem that could be considered a variant of the secretary problem 
with multiple relaxed assumptions (Cox & Oaxaca, 1989). Although Cox & Oaxaca discuss 
the importance of avoiding emotive terms in a sequential job search task (for their research 
question), the study does not include a treatment that would permit a conclusion as to 
whether sequential search is influenced by context.  
 
4 The secretary problem was first published in February 1960 Scientific American of Martin Gardner column 
of mathematical games. According to Gardner, it was originally devised in 1958 by John Fox of the 
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Company and Gerald Marnie of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
and called the game of googol. See Ferguson (1989) and Freeman (1983) for historical reviews. 
5
 Recall in the current paper refers to the ability to withdraw any previously made decision. 
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While many of these experiments frame the decisions in a particular context (e.g., 
interviewing candidates for a position or searching for new apartments) and present a 
specific content (e.g., relative rank of the current candidate with respect to the already 
interviewed candidates or the relative rank of the current apartment and the probability of 
successfully recalling a previously rejected apartment), we are unaware of any studies 
explicitly exploring whether framing exacerbates or alleviates early stopping behavior. 
Previous research finds that the quality of sequential search decisions might be susceptible 
to how the offers are presented in the classical secretary problem (Corbin, Olson & 
Abbondanza, 1975). When the actual value of each offer and the distribution of offers are 
presented, people search more than when only the relative rank is available (Palley & 
Kremer, 2014). Therefore, the amount of information available may potentially influence 
the length of search.  
 
DIFFERENT DECISIONS UNDER DIFFERENT CONTEXT FRAMES 
A recent study finds that people actively seek out richer information to facilitate their 
decisions in the dictator game (Thunström, Cherry, McEvoy & Shogren, 2016). Ample 
empirical evidence also shows that framing a decision-making problem in a particular 
context might result in different choices from a context-free (neutral) frame (e.g., Levin & 
Gaeth, 1988; Duchon, Dunegan & Barton, 1989; Gamliel & Peer, 2010). Dual-processing 
theory that consists of system one (intuitive/heuristic) and system two (analytic/executive) 
processes has been proposed to explain why different decisions result from how the problem 
is framed (e.g., Kahneman, 2003; Evans, 2008). The context effect can be caused by 
different decision-making schemas belonging to system one. 
Some schemas are activated chronically and involuntarily due to the regular contact 
with environmental context (Freeman, 2007). They are formed from previous experiences 
and are then used to organize or integrate new information (see Bower & Cirilo, 1985; 
Dimaggio, 1997; Narvaez & Bock, 2002, for a more detailed discussion on schemas). Once 
schemas are formed, they operate constantly in the brain and are activated by stimuli that 
resemble the stimuli that were present when the schema was first created (Higgins & 
Chaires, 1980; also see Narvaez, & Bock, 2002). Experimental evidence also shows the 
brain re-applies existing schema to explain a new experience (Heider & Simmel, 1944). 
Although people may feel they are experiencing novelty every day, the novelty is perceived 
and interpreted by existing schemas without consciously being processed by the brain 
(Wegner & Wheathey, 1999).  
 
EVIDENCE OF MAKING BETTER DECISIONS WITH CONTEXT  
Just as a schema can be activated through the same or a similar stimulus encountered 
in previous experiences, making decisions in a context allows us to effectively resolve 
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problems without starting from scratch every time. For example, experimentation on the 
Wason selection task testing deductive reasoning finds only 5 % of the participants are able 
to solve the context-free problem correctly (Johnson-Laird & Wason, 1970). A drastic 
increase in correct answers is reported in versions involving a social exchange to detect 
cheaters (e.g., Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides et al., 2010; Sugiyama et al., 2002) or described 
as a drinking age problem (Griggs & Cox, 1982). These findings suggest that in some 
instances context aids understanding of the task and reduces confusion among participants.  
Both content (e.g., drinks and age) and the context or scenario (e.g., policeman 
checking patrons’ age in a bar), within which this content is relevant are necessary to 
facilitate an increase in accurate responses (Pollard & Evans, 1987). Our experiment is able 
to verify whether context is a stronger contributor to people’s performance than content, by 
observing the marginal effect caused by providing additional informational content on the 
top of framing. There are two other major differences between our experiment and that of 
Pollard and Evans. First, Pollard and Evans employ a reasoning task while our experiment 
employs a sequential search task. Second, in Pollard and Evans the participants are not 
incentivized for their performance, whereas the decisions in our experiment have monetary 
consequences.6 Economic experiments also demonstrate that context affects incentivized 
behavior. Alekseev et al. (2017) survey the literature and conclude that context often but not 
invariably improves performance with the improvement being more likely if the task 
requires sophisticated reasoning. (While the survey did not contain any secretary problem 
studies, the task seems to qualify as requiring sophisticated reasoning.)  
Our contribution to this line of research stems from varying the amount of 
information provided within a context. The aforementioned study by Thunström et al. (2016) 
suggests that people endogenously seek information which in turn alters their behavior. A 
richer descriptive information might potentially be more effective in activating the 
appropriate schema and facilitating better quality decisions. Thus, apart from extending the 
analysis of context effects to the area of sequential search, our study addresses a previously 
unexplored link between the amount of information necessary to generate the context effect. 
In what follows, we experimentally identify whether framing itself is capable of improving 
search decisions or whether a richer description of the environment aids people to extend 
their search closer to the optimal level.7   
 
6 It is important to note that not all contexts have a positive effect on performance and learning. For example, 
embedding the Wason selection task in the contexts of city transportation, and stamps on letters did not improve 
accuracy (Griggs & Cox, 1982). Cooper, Kagel, Lo and Gu (1999) suggest that for the context to facilitate 
understanding and learning, the context needs to be relevant to the task and familiar to the participants (e.g., 
college students may be more familiar with the drink and age context than the letter and stamp context). 
7 Naturally, we also verify whether the change in behavior, if any, is an improvement or deterioration of the 
quality of decisions. 
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3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
We designed an experiment to analyze the effect of context on sequential search 
activity in the secretary problem in which the participants earn payoffs based on the offers 
they accept.8 In particular, we identify whether framing of sequential search as selling 
houses results in different behavior than when the search is described in a context-free 
manner and whether a richer descriptive content is required to generate the context effect.  
An important feature of our experiment is employing a context that likely only few if any of 
our participants (due to their age) had experience with. The experiment therefore presents a 
conservative test of our hypotheses. If we observe that a context that has never been 
experienced can still improve decisions, employing a context that one has direct experience 
with is likely to yield even a stronger effect. 
The experiment consists of three treatments implemented in an across-subject 
design: No Frame, House Frame, and House Frame with Info. There is no monetary search 
cost. The offers are presented in experimental currency units with the exchange rate of 1000 
ECU = 1 NZD, announced at the beginning of the experiment. The experiment, programmed 
and conducted with zTree software (Fischbacher, 2007), consists of 2 practice rounds and 
10 cumulatively paid rounds. In each round, there are 20 available offers, distribution of 
which is unknown to participants. The offers are identical across the three treatments (see 
Table 1 for details). Each sequence of offers, including those in the practice rounds, was 
generated in MS Excel by randomly sampling from an interval of the average house price 
(in thousands of NZD) in a different Christchurch suburb plus/minus the standard deviation 
for that suburb.9 The house transactions took place in October 2014. The transaction 
information was obtained from the Quotable Value Ltd. database (qv.co.nz). 
The participants in the No Frame treatment receive neutrally-framed instructions 
about their task; there is no mention of a house, its description, or any additional information. 
In the House Frame treatment, the task is framed as selling houses, but no additional 
information about houses is provided. Finally, the House Frame with Info treatment employs 
identical instructions to the House Frame one with an added statement that the participant 
will be given a brief description of the house. During the decision-making stage the 
computer screen displays a description of a house, consisting of the floor area, the number 
of bedrooms, suburb and year the house was built in, prior to presenting a price offer. Each 
round features a different house description. The house descriptions were also obtained from 
 
8 In contrast to the classical secretary problem (see Ferguson, 1989 for a discussion), which assumes people 
derive utility only from the optimal choice (i.e., the highest offer), our experiment allows the participants to 
earn money also from sub-optimal choices (see Bearden, Rapoport, & Murphy, 2006 for more details). That 
is, participants earn money in the experiment based on the actual value of the offer they accept, instead of zero 
payoffs when anything other than the highest offer is selected.  
9 Randbetween (lowerlimit, upperlimit). 
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the Quotable Value database. The full instructions for all treatments are provided in 
Appendix A. 
 
Table 1. Price offer sequences implemented in the experiment 
Variable Sequence optimal Predicted optimal Min. Average 
offer 
SD 
Round Position Offer Position Offer 
1 8 848 8 848 276 509.6 165.4 
2 10 875 8 818 2 469.15 284.4 
3 10 708 10 708 207 437.6 147.2 
4 20 733 20 733 267 518.5 145.5 
5 13 578 10 484 186 331.15 114.4 
6 10 1574 9 1400 89 714.25 447.4 
7 19 581 19 581 197 369.2 128.1 
8 3 966 20 541 250 636.4 234.4 
9 14 1740 12 1264 105 756.4 396.2 
10 4 625 20 553 250 440.4 101.3 
Average 11.1 922.8 13.6 793.0 183 518.3 216.4 
Notes: Sequence optimal position = the position with the highest offer in the implemented sequence, see 
Appendix B for details; Sequence optimal offer = the highest offer value in each round; Predicted optimal 
position = the stopping position predicted by the optimal decision rule (the decision rule which yields the 
highest earning), see Appendix C for details; Predicted optimal offer = the offer at the position predicted by 
the optimal decision rule, see Appendix C for details. Min. = the lowest offer in each round. Average offer = 
the average offer in the implemented sequence for each round. SD = the standard deviation of 20 price offers 
in each round.  
We compare the participants’ decisions based on the stopping position and their 
accepted offers. We assume that the participants are risk-neutral decision-makers who aim 
to maximize their expected payoffs. The first hypothesis, formulated with reference to 
experiments on the Wason selection task, is that people make better decisions when 
presented with a context than without. Theoretically, this would be because having a context 
allows one to better assess the situation (and access existing schema constructed from a 
similar experience), for example, selling an object in everyday life. According to previous 
psychology research, when no context is available, a person might experience difficulty in 
determining what schema to apply and the chance of applying an inappropriate schema is 
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increased. Assuming we replicate early stopping behavior in our experimental set up, we 
expect the House Frame and House Frame with Info treatments to produce longer search 
and higher accepted offers (and given that there is not monetary search cost also total 
earnings) than the No Frame treatment.10 
Hypothesis 1: People search longer and accept higher offers when decisions are 
framed as selling houses (both with and without additional information) than when they are 
framed neutrally.  
It is possible that having a comprehensive description of the house – for example, 
floor area, number of bedrooms, the year the house was built – is also critical in activating 
a useful schema, yielding a stronger context effect. We therefore expect participants to 
search longer and their accepted offers to be higher in the House Frame with Info treatment 
than in the House Frame. 
Hypothesis 2: People search longer and accept higher offers when decisions are 
framed as selling houses and more content-relevant information is available than when there 
is no such information.  
At the same time, we recognize that having to process additional information in the 
House Frame with Info treatment could be distracting to participants and might result in 
more noise. 
 
PROCEDURES AND PARTICIPANTS 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Canterbury in Christchurch, New 
Zealand. The payoff protocol was single-blind, meaning that the experimenter was able to 
match participant decisions to their identity. The participants were recruited via ORSEE 
(Greiner, 2015). After arriving at the lab, the participants were randomly assigned to a 
cubicle and read the instructions at their own pace. Any questions were answered in private. 
A total of 137 students participated in the experiment: 46 in the No Frame treatment, 43 in 
House Frame, and 48 in House Frame with Info. A session lasted on average 45 minutes 
and the participants earned NZD 12.10 on average. 
 
 
10 Our hypotheses rely on the implicit simplifying assumption that there are no unobserved search costs, such 
as the time search cost or processing cost. In reality, search is costly and a higher accepted offer from longer 
search may not necessarily result in a higher net payoff. See Hsiao, Kemp, Servátka & Ward (2019) for 
evidence of how time search cost influences the length of search and overall payoffs.  
10 
 
4. SIMULATION  
What is the optimal decision rule for a payoff-maximizing risk-neutral decision-
maker in our variation of the secretary problem? Since the distribution of offers in our 
experiment is unknown to participants, we conduct a simulation that allows to evaluate the 
performance of different decision rules. Each simulation compares the payoffs resulting 
from 20 different decision rules (as there was a maximum of 20 offers; each decision rule 
prescribes how many offers to reject in order to learn about the distribution, followed by 
accepting the next highest offer), which contain all possible stopping positions (i.e., an 
individual stops the search by accepting the nth offer in a given sequence; where 1 ≤ n ≤ 20). 
Each simulation iteration generates a set of 20 random offers in the same way as the actual 
offers used in the experiment were generated. Once a set of offers has been generated, the 
offers are (implicitly) ordered from the highest to lowest and assigned a rank within this 
particular order. These offer values and the rank for each offer are recorded to test the 
performance of each decision rule. The simulation runs separately for each round with 1.2 
million iterations.  
We compare the performance of all 20 possible decision rules using both the average 
payoffs (in ECUs) they yield (calculated in the simulation as the average accepted offer 
prescribed by the decision rule) and the frequency of each decision rule finding the optimal 
offer (in %). The average payoff statistic indicates which decision rule yields the highest 
payoff. The optimal offer frequency statistic shows which decision rule finds the optimal 
price offer most frequently.  
11 
 
  
Figure 1. The average payoff for all decision rules 
 
According to the simulation, the decision rule to “Accept the next highest offer after 
seeing 4 offers” yields the highest average payoff of 524.3 ECUs (see Figure 1). The 
decision rule “Accept the next highest offer after seeing 7 offers” finds the most optimal 
offers as presented in Figure 2, just as the optimal decision rule of the classical version of 
the secretary problem (20/e = 7.4 offers). However, the decision rule “Accept the next 
highest offer after seeing 7 offers” yields only 518.9 ECUs on average. The simulation thus 
indicates that, when any accepted offer generates a positive payoff (as opposed to only the 
best one as in the classical secretary problem) and the goal is to maximize the payoff, it 
might be better to stop the search sooner (i.e., accept an earlier offer) than prescribed by the 
solution to the classical secretary problem.11 
 
11 If one were to implement only one decision rule to sell all 10 houses, the decision rule "Accept the next 
highest offer after seeing 7 offers" has the highest average accepted offer and “Accept the next highest offer 
after seeing 9 offers" finds the most optimal offers in the sequences used in our experiment (see Appendix C).  
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Figure 2. The frequency of finding the optimal offer for all decision rules 
 
5. RESULTS 
First, we describe the summary statistics and test our hypotheses. Then, we examine 
whether there is a repetition effect found in any of the treatments, namely whether decisions 
in the latter rounds differ from those in the earlier rounds.  
There are two dependent variables: the amount of search, i.e. the position in the 
sequence where the participant stops searching and accepts the offer (henceforth stopping 
position), and the accepted offer in ECUs. (Recall that there is no search cost and hence the 
acceptance of a higher offer results in higher total earnings.) The summary statistics relating 
to these two dependent variables are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
    
  Stopping position Accepted offers 
  Average SD Average SD 
No Frame 9.8 3.6 688.0 75.0 
House Frame 11.2 2.8 727.0 36.1 
House Frame with Info 11.6 2.8 733.9 58.1 
Sequence optimal* 11.1 
 
922.8 
 
Predicted optimal** 13.6   793.0   
*Sequence optimal refers to the actual optimal position/offer from the sequences implemented in the 
experiment.  
** The predicted result from applying the optimal decision rule to the sequences implemented in the 
experiment (see Appendix C for more detail). This serves as a benchmark only, not for a direct comparison to 
participants’ decisions.  
Notes: SD presents the standard deviation. 
 
STOPPING POSITION 
The participants searched less in the No Frame treatment and on average stopped 
their search 1.3 positions prior to the sequence optimal position (11.1), which is a position 
with the highest price offer in the implemented sequence. In contrast, the average stopping 
positions in the House Frame and House Frame with Info treatments are respectively 0.1 
and 0.5 positions higher than the sequence optimal position. (Table 2 panel A). The OLS 
regression models regressing the stopping position on whether the participant was subjected 
to framing (Framing = 1 in both House Frame and House Frame with Info and 0 in No 
Frame) and on the interaction term of Framing*Information (Information = 1 in the House 
Frame with Info and 0 otherwise) are presented in Panel A of Table 3. Models (1) and (2) 
confirm that framing significantly increased the amount of search whereas providing 
information on top of framing had no significant effect on search length. Model (2) with 
added demographic variables finds that search decreases with age and being a female. All 
models have errors clustered at the individual level. 
Result 1: The house-selling frame (with or without information) leads to more 
search than no frame. The house-description information has no additional effect on the 
amount of search when the task is framed as selling houses.   
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Table 3. OLS regression analysis of the stopping position and accepted offers 
Panel A. Stopping position 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 
(St. Error) (St. Error) (St. Error) (St. Error) 
Framing 1.42** 1.42** 1.42 1.42** 
 
(0.67) (0.65) (0.67)** (0.65) 
Framing*Info 0.34 0.23 0.34 0.23 
 
(0.58) (0.56) (0.58) (0.56) 
Gender  
 
− 1.08** 
 
− 1.08** 
  
(0.50) 
 
(0.50) 
Age 
 
− 0.61* 
 
− 0.61* 
  
(0.32) 
 
(0.32) 
Round 
  
0.05 0.05 
   
(0.05) (0.05) 
Constant 9.8 11.38*** 9.52*** 11.08*** 
 (0.52) (0.77) (0.65) (0.86) 
N 137 137 137 137 
R2 0.012** 0.021*** 0.012* 0.021*** 
Panel B. Accepted offers (ECUs) 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
 
(St. Error) (St. Error) (St. Error) (St. Error) 
Framing 38.92*** 37.89*** 38.92*** 37.89*** 
 
(12.27) (11.66) (12.28) (11.66) 
Framing*Info 6.93 8.00 6.93 8.00 
 
(9.97) (9.74) (9.97) (9.74) 
Gender   − 17.62*  − 17.62* 
 
 (9.37)  (9.37) 
Age  − 2.68  − 2.68 
 
 (6.57)  (6.57) 
Round   7.27*** 7.27*** 
 
  (0.90) (0.90) 
Constant 688.03*** 701.65*** 648.04*** 661.66*** 
 (10.99) (14.87) (12.18) (15.56) 
N 137 137 137 137 
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R2 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 
Notes: Framing = 0 for No Frame, Framing = 1 for House Frame and House Frame with Info. The interaction 
term Framing*Information picks up the effect of providing information. Gender = 0 for male, and female =1. 
Age coded as a categorical variable, 18-19=0, 20-29=1, 30-39=2, 40-49=3, 50-59=4. Standard errors clustered 
at the individual level across all models.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-level, 
respectively. 
 
ACCEPTED OFFERS 
The OLS regression models regressing the accepted offers on whether the participant 
was subjected to framing and the interaction term of Framing*Information are presented in 
Panel B of Table 3. Models (1) and (2) confirm that framing significantly increased the 
earnings whereas providing information on top of framing had no significant effect. Model 
(2) with added demographic variables finds a weak negative effect of being a female on the 
accepted offers whereas age has no effect.12 
Result 2: The house-selling frame (with or without information) leads to higher 
accepted offers than no frame. The house-description information has no additional effect 
on the accepted offers when the task is framed as selling houses. 
 
REPETITION EFFECT 
To examine whether the performance of participants improves with experience, we 
add a variable Round in the OLS regression models (3) and (4), presented in Table 3. We 
find a significant positive trend in the accepted offers, but do not find any trend in the amount 
of search over the course of the experimental session. Such specification, however, assumes 
that the trend between all periods remains identical throughout the session. Since the impact 
of experience on the amount of search might vary over time (and across treatments), we also 
contrast participants’ stopping positions in the first half of the session (rounds 1 – 5) with 
stopping positions in the second half of the session (rounds 6 – 10). We conduct the same 
analysis also for the accepted offers. 
Table 4 presents results of regressing the stopping position (Panel A) and accepted 
offers (Panel B) on Framing and the interaction term of Framing*Information, split into 
session halves. For the accepted offers we observe that Framing is significant in both halves, 
albeit in the first half only at the 5% significance level. For the stopping position we observe 
 
12
 Pearson correlation analysis examining the relationship between the average stopping positions, accepted 
offers, and the optimal offer frequency is presented in Appendix D. 
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that Framing is significant only in the second half of the session with the interaction term 
also being weakly significant in the second half. This result is driven by the fact that the 
amount of search is not significantly different across any of the three treatments in the first 
half of the session (see Figure 3) whereas in the second half the participants in the No Frame 
treatment search less, contrary to our prior that the context effect will cause the participants 
to search longer from the very beginning of the session.  
Table 4: OLS regression analysis of the stopping position and accepted offers split 
into the session halves 
Panel A. Stopping position 
 
Independent variable First Half (Round 1 – 5) Second Half (Round 6 – 10) 
 
Coefficient Coefficient 
  (Standard Error) (Standard Error) 
Framing  1.23 1.62*** 
 
(0.90) (0.55) 
Framing*Info − 0.44 1.12* 
 
(0.69) (0.62) 
Constant 11.24*** 8.39*** 
 (0.72) (0.37) 
N 137 137 
R2 0.006 0.024*** 
Panel B. Accepted offers (ECUs) 
 
Independent variable First Half (Round 1-5) Second Half (Round 6-10) 
 
Coefficient Coefficient 
  (Standard Error) (Standard Error) 
Framing  29.55** 48.30*** 
 
(11.41) (15.78) 
Framing*Info 4.97 8.90 
 
(8.29) (15.62) 
Constant 634.02*** 742.03*** 
 (10.41) (12.58) 
N 137 137 
R2 0.013** 0.010*** 
Notes: Framing = 0 for No Frame, Framing = 1 for House Frame and House Frame with Info. The interaction 
term Framing*Information picks up the effect of providing information. Standard errors clustered at the 
individual level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%-level, respectively. 
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We note that the comparison between the session halves may also be influenced by 
the actual sequence optimal position (recall that there are five sequence optimal positions in 
each session half). The results show that participants in the No Frame treatment searched 
less (on average by 1.0 position) than the sequence optimal position in the first half and were 
even further away (on average by 1.6 positions less) from the sequence optimal position in 
the second half of the session.13 As shown in Figure 3, participants in the House Frame and 
House Frame with Info treatments stopped their search closer to the sequence optimal 
position than in the No Frame treatment in both the first and second halves of the session, 
providing further evidence that framing improves the quality of search decisions. 
Result 3: The house-selling frame (with or without information) leads to more 
search than no frame in the latter rounds. The house-description information weakly 
increases the amount of search in the second half of the session when the task is framed as 
selling-houses.  
Result 4: The house-selling frame (with or without information) leads to higher 
accepted offers than no frame in the latter rounds. The house-description information has no 
effect on accepted offers in the entire session when the task is framed as selling houses.  
 
Figure 3. The average stopping position (averaged across participants) in the first 
half of the session (rounds 1 – 5) and the second half of the session (rounds 6 – 10)  
 
 
13 The sequence optimal position in the first half was 12.2 and in the second half 10.0. 
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Figure 4. The average accepted offers (averaged across participants) in the first half 
(rounds 1 – 5) and second half of the session (rounds 6 – 10) 
 
6. DISCUSSION 
This study extends the empirical analysis of context effects to the domain of 
sequential search where the implemented task was framed as selling houses. We further 
contribute to the literature by exploring the link between the amount of information 
necessary to generate the context effect. Using a conservative experimental design, we show 
that even a context which only few of our participants were likely to have had past 
experience with can result in improved decisions.  
The experiment confirms the hypothesis that the participants search longer and 
accept higher offers when framing is introduced as an experimental manipulation 
(Hypothesis 1). This result is consistent with the conjecture that having a context can activate 
existing schemas that enhance decision-making ability, as previously found in reasoning 
task experiments. At the same time, we do not find an effect of providing additional context-
specific information on participants’ decisions; framing itself appears to be sufficient to 
generate the context effect (Hypothesis 2).  
The underlying cause of the No Frame treatment featuring less search than the House 
Frame and House Frame with Info treatments in the latter rounds might be a quicker loss of 
attention. Schema literature finds several mechanisms by which schemas influence attention, 
facilitate the interpretation of information, and drive decision-making processes (e.g., Huff, 
1982; Thomas, Clark & Gioia, 1993). Relatedly to our research question, schemas filter task-
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relevant information that the decision-makers pay attention to (e.g., Nadkarni & Narayanan, 
2007) and enable decision-makers to postulate causal-effect associations (such as “when I 
want to sell a house, I first need to figure out what a good price to sell is”) when presented 
with information (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1977). Research on schema shows that sense-
making processes are essential to people’s performance and behavior in general (e.g., Ford, 
1985; Nystrom & Starbuck, 1984). Once people are able to interpret (make sense of) the 
task, making decisions often involves the integration of information from multiple texts 
within the task. Previous research demonstrates that relevant information from a prior text 
is spontaneously activated when the target text is read, thereby enabling integration between 
different texts (Beker, Jolles, Lorch, & Broek, 2016). This suggests that people in the House 
Frame and House Frame with Information treatments may be able to integrate relevant 
information (i.e., selling houses) when the target text (i.e., price offers) is presented. The 
interpretation and integration of the information may then facilitate the decision-making 
process in the secretary problem where the task requires cognitive effort to perform, and 
ensuing search behavior. People in the House Frame and House Frame with Information 
treatments may, therefore, be less likely to lose their attention than in the No Frame 
treatment. At the same time, we would like to point out that this above explanation is ex-
post and that not enough is known about how schema activation is demonstrated in 
sequential search behavior.  
Previous research finds that people search more when less information is available 
(see e.g. Palley & Kremer, 2014 for evidence when the distribution of offers is known). 
However, this is not what we find in our data. There are at least two potential underlying 
causes for observing less search in a context-free setting. First, without a context, system 
one is unable to effectively associate a new experience with existing knowledge and 
strategies that the decision-maker has obtained from past experiences in a similar situation. 
This means that our participants might be forming their search strategy through trial and 
error, which is supported by higher standard deviations in the No Frame treatment. Second, 
it is possible that, without context, people are applying an inappropriate schema, an 
explanation potentially relevant from the methodological perspective as a large fraction of 
economics experiments is conducted without framing and in a context-free setting. It is not 
entirely clear whether participants always apply their own framing in such situations 
(Thunström et al., 2016 provide evidence for the dictator game), which could potentially 
lead to a loss of control over the data generating process. Whether people indeed apply their 
preferred framing to context-free tasks and whether the frequency of own-framing adoption 
interacts with certain design features, such as the complexity of the task, clearly deserves 
further investigation as it has fundamental methodological implications.  
It is important to keep in mind the limitations of our study. Our experiment adopts a 
house-selling context to explore schema activation, a mechanism hypothesized to trigger the 
context effect, but not explicitly tested for in behavioral sciences. Instead, the evidence for 
schema activation is (often) indirect; whenever one observes the context effect, it is assumed 
that a schema has been activated. Furthermore, as there is no general theory explaining the 
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effect of context on decision-making, it is unknown what type of framing one should use to 
achieve a particular outcome, for example, to improve people’s decisions to obtain higher 
earnings. From that perspective, the results of a house-selling frame may not generalize to 
other contexts, such as to the context of buying houses, or selling or buying cars. While the 
issues of whether context and framing effects carry over from one environment to another 
or whether they are task specific are outside the scope of our research question, we view 
them as promising future areas of research.  
To conclude, our research adds to the existing literature on the importance of context 
in decision-making (e.g. Alekseev et al. 2017). Our results extend the range of tasks 
requiring sophisticated reasoning, performance in which is improved by adding context, to 
include the secretary problem. Our results also show that once context is established, 
providing additional information in order to strengthen it does not appear to be critical.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS [same for all treatments] 
Overview 
You are about to participate in a decision-making experiment. If you follow these 
instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to 
you in cash at the end of the experiment. If you have a question at any time, please raise 
your hand and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private. 
We ask that you not to talk otherwise during the experiment. Also, please turn off your 
cell-phone and do not use the computer for any other purpose than your participation in the 
experiment requires. If you break these rules, we will have to exclude you from the 
experiment and from all payments. 
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE NO FRAME TREATMENT 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will participate in 10 rounds. In each round, you will be asked to decide whether to 
accept or reject a number. The numbers are randomly generated by the computer and 
available one at a time. Once a number is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If 
you accept the number, you receive the amount represented by the number (in 
experimental currency units, as will be explained below). All decisions are final. If you 
reject the number, the number will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously 
rejected number. In total there are 20 numbers available; if you have not accepted a 
number prior to the 20th number, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) 
number. Therefore, make your decisions carefully. 
There is no time limit on how long the numbers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each number. 
Practice rounds 
There will be two practice rounds. These practice rounds are there to help you become 
familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in these two 
practice rounds. 
How payoffs are determined 
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 
1000 ECUs = 1 NZD 
Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when 
you leave the lab. The more ECUs you earn, the more NZD you earn. 
Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
Total ECUs you earn 
= 
Accepted number for Round 1 + Accepted number for Round 2 + ….+ Accepted number 
for Round 10 
Example: Suppose you accepted the number 450 for Round 1, 260 for Round 2, 380 for 
Round 3….., 658 for Round 10. The total amount of ECUs you earn is 450+260+380+…. 
+658. 
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice rounds, 
with no money payoffs. Then, you will make decisions in 10 rounds with money payoffs.  
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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE HOUSE FRAME TREATMENT  
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each scenario, 
you will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular house. 
You will be given a series of price offers for each scenario. The price offers are randomly 
generated by the computer and available one at a time. Once a price offer is presented, you 
can either accept or reject it. If you accept the price offer, the house will be sold at the 
price you accepted. All sales are final. If you reject the price offer, the offer will disappear; 
you cannot go back to the previously rejected offer. In total there are 20 price offers 
available for each house; if you have not accepted an offer prior to the 20th offer, you will 
be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) offer. Therefore, make your decisions carefully. 
There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each offer. 
Practice scenarios 
There will be two practice scenarios. These practice scenarios are there to help you 
become familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in 
these two practice scenarios. 
How payoffs are determined 
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 
1000 ECUs = 1 NZD 
Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when 
you leave the lab. The more ECUs you earn, the more NZD you earn.  
Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
Total ECUs you earn 
= 
Accepted price offer for House 1 + Accepted price offer for House 2 + ….+ Accepted 
price offer for House 10 
 
Example: Suppose you accepted the price offer 450 for House 1, 260 for House 2, 380 for 
House 3,…, 658 for House 10. The total amount of ECUs you earn is 450+260+380+…. 
+658. 
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice scenarios, 
with no money payoffs. Then, you will make decisions in 10 scenarios with money 
payoffs.   
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 INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE HOUSE FRAME WITH INFO TREATMENT  
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
You will participate in 10 scenarios, in which you will be selling houses. In each scenario, 
you will be asked to decide whether to accept or reject a price offer for a particular house. 
You will be given a brief description of the house that will be followed by a series of price 
offers. The price offers are randomly generated by the computer and available one at a 
time. Once a price offer is presented, you can either accept or reject it. If you accept the 
price offer, the house will be sold at the price you accepted. All sales are final. If you reject 
the price offer, the offer will disappear; you cannot go back to the previously rejected 
offer. In total there are 20 price offers available for each house; if you have not accepted 
an offer prior to the 20th offer, you will be forced to accept the 20th (i.e. the final) offer. 
Therefore, make your decisions carefully. 
There is no time limit on how long the price offers will be available for, so take as long as 
you need to evaluate each offer. 
Practice scenarios 
There will be two practice scenarios. These practice scenarios are there to help you 
become familiar with the software. You will not be paid for the decisions you make in 
these two practice scenarios. 
How payoffs are determined 
The payoffs will be denoted in experimental currency units (ECUs). 
1000 ECUs = 1 NZD 
Your ECUs will be converted into NZD at this rate, and you will be paid in NZD when 
you leave the lab. The more ECUs you earn, the more NZD you earn.  
Your payoffs are determined as follows: 
Total ECUs you earn 
= 
Accepted price offer for House 1 + Accepted price offer for House 2 + ….+ Accepted 
price offer for House 10 
 
Example: Suppose you accepted the price offer 450 for House 1, 260 for House 2, 380 for 
House 3,…, 658 for House 10. The total amount of ECUs you earn is 450+260+380+…. 
+658. 
Do you have any questions? 
You are now ready to begin the experiment. First, we will conduct two practice scenarios, 
with no money payoffs. Then, you will make decisions in 10 scenarios with money 
payoffs.   
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APPENDIX B.  
 
Table 4. The actual price offers sequences used in the experiment 
Round 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Offer 
   1 388 739 310 420 292 494 522 252 789 341 
   2 488 803 290 637 264 225 252 709 829 459 
   3 683 221 637 727 344 272 562 966 996 453 
   4 321 729 372 561 266 994 255 885 241 625 
   5 625 159 619 643 396 602 370 737 799 504 
   6 744 150 207 663 445 987 292 449 722 387 
   7 279 299 455 568 266 523 533 910 1088 250 
   8 848 818 400 636 241 683 237 250 876 308 
   9 276 585 251 422 370 1400 262 933 503 492 
   10 678 875 708 336 484 1574 343 491 650 455 
   11 408 130 452 414 264 1413 220 450 890 353 
   12 435 795 516 479 186 184 460 394 1264 588 
   13 679 481 420 332 578 1081 294 899 645 438 
   14 465 2 607 494 244 558 535 372 1740 408 
   15 393 525 410 546 189 273 297 505 1179 481 
   16 397 429 324 724 565 1182 452 608 250 467 
   17 588 62 214 411 271 305 284 827 840 418 
   18 358 459 480 267 235 661 436 712 272 273 
   19 644 748 463 357 350 785 581 838 449 554 
   20 495 374 617 733 373 89 197 541 105 553 
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APPENDIX C.  
Table 5. Summary of predicted results for the average accepted offers, optimal offer 
frequency, and average stopping position after applying different decision rules to the 
sequences used in the experiment.  
                                           Variable Average 
accepted offers 
(ECUs) 
Optimal offer 
frequency 
(%) 
Average 
stopping 
position 
Decision rule    
Accept the first offer 454.7 0 1 
Accept the next highest after seeing 1 662.9 0 2.6 
Accept the next highest after seeing 2 735.2 20 3.7 
Accept the next highest after seeing 3 722.8 40 10.3 
Accept the next highest after seeing 4 756.2 30 12.4 
Accept the next highest after seeing 5 761.1 30 12.5 
Accept the next highest after seeing 6 775.4 40 13.1 
Accept the next highest after seeing 7 793.0 40 13.6 
Accept the next highest after seeing 8 763.4 40 15 
Accept the next highest after seeing 9 780.8 50 15.1 
Accept the next highest after seeing 10 582.5 30 18.4 
Accept the next highest after seeing 11 582.5 30 18.4 
Accept the next highest after seeing 12 630.1 40 18.6 
Accept the next highest after seeing 13 609.6 30 19.3 
Accept the next highest after seeing 14 446.1 20 19.9 
Accept the next highest after seeing 15 446.1 20 19.9 
Accept the next highest after seeing 16 446.1 20 19.9 
Accept the next highest after seeing 17 446.1 20 19.9 
Accept the next highest after seeing 18 446.1 20 19.9 
Accept the last offer 407.7 10 20 
Notes: The average accepted offer (in ECUs) is obtained by averaging the 10 price offers prescribed by a given 
decision rule. The optimal offer frequency is obtained by adding the number of rounds in which each decision 
rule finds the optimal offer (out of 10 rounds). The average stopping position is obtained by averaging the final 
stopping position (i.e. the offer accepted) across 10 rounds.   
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APPENDIX D.  
PEARSON CORRELATION ANALYSIS 
We use Pearson correlation analysis to examine the relationship between the average 
stopping positions, the accepted offers, and the optimal offer frequency. The average 
stopping position is obtained by averaging the 10 actual stopping position for each 
participant. The average accepted offer is calculated for each participant by averaging the 
10 offers she accepted. The optimal offer frequency shows the total number of rounds in 
which the participants find the optimal offer (out of 10 rounds).  
Unsurprisingly, we find a positive significant correlation between the frequency in 
which the optimal offer is accepted and the accepted offers for all three treatments (r = 0.57, 
p < 0.001). This is expected because the optimal offer is the highest offer in each round. 
Accepting the optimal offer in more rounds will therefore result in a higher average accepted 
offer. There is a large positive and significant correlation between the length of search and 
the size of the accepted offer (r = 0.61, p < 0.001), as well as the frequency of accepted 
optimal offers (r = 0.24, p = 0.005). The longer the participants search, the more often they 
accept the optimal offers. Also, the longer the participants search, the higher are their 
accepted offers. However, an individual correlation analysis for each treatment shows that 
the correlation between the search length and the size of the accepted offer is statistically 
significant only for the No Frame and House Frame with Info treatments (No Frame, r = 
0.77, p < 0.001; House Frame with Info, r = 0.56, p < 0.001, respectively), while for the 
House Frame treatment the correlation is not statistically significant (r = 0.12, p = 0.40). 
Only in the No Frame treatment is there a significant correlation between the length of 
search and the frequency of accepted optimal offers (r = 0.54, p < 0.001); the same 
correlations in the House Frame (r = − 0.02, p = 0.88) and House Frame with Info (r = 0.02, 
p = 0.90) treatments are not statistically significant. 
 
 
